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Abstract During 2013 the Tor network had a mas-
sive spike in new users as a botnet started using Tor
hidden services to hide its C&C (Command and Con-
trol) servers. This resulted in network congestion and
reduced performance for all users. Tor hidden services
are attractive to botnet herders because they provide
anonymity for both the C&C servers and the bots. The
aim of this paper is to present a superior way that Tor
hidden services can be used for botnet C&C which min-
imises harm to the Tor network while retaining all se-
curity benefits.
Keywords Tor hidden services · Botnet command &
control · Botnet architecture · Tor security
1 Introduction
Tor is a public anonymity network that runs on free
open-source software developed by the Tor Project [11].
In broad terms an anonymity network is a network that
you can forward your Internet traffic over in order to
hide your IP address from end servers. Tor hidden ser-
vices are feature of Tor that allow you to anonymise
both ends of a connection: the client doesn’t know
the identity (IP address) of the server, and the server
doesn’t know the identity of the client.
In late 2013 the Tor network suddenly came under
heavy load due to a botnet that had begun using Tor
hidden services to hide its C&C (Command & Con-
trol) servers [1,3]. The botnet using Tor was initially
dubbed Mevade [3], however, it was later discovered
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that Mevade was an existing botnet called Sefnit that
had been upgraded to use Tor [5].
With regards to botnets, C&C refers to the man-
agement of a botnet by its herder, who is typically its
owner. A C&C scheme is a method of propagating or-
ders from a botnet herder to the hundreds, thousands,
or even millions of bots in their botnet. Botnet orders
can be all sorts of things; for instance some botnets
are used for click-fraud [2], others are used to perform
DDoS attacks [7], and some are used to send email
spam [9]. The purpose of the Sefnit botnet was to com-
mit click-fraud and mine Bitcoin [3,5,6].
Since Sefnit appeared in the Tor network the num-
ber of bots has been slowly decreasing as efforts have
been made by Microsoft [6] and others to shut it down.
Later versions of the Sefnit software were reported to
no longer use Tor [8]; instead they switched back to an
SSH based scheme which had been used prior to Tor.
Tor is now down from approximately 5.5 million users
(4.5 million suspected bots) to approximately 2.5 mil-
lion users [10].
We provide here a relatively efficient scheme for
performing botnet C&C using features of Tor hidden
services. The goal here is to allow a botnet to coexist
peacefully with regular Tor clients in the network.
The use of Tor provides several potential benefits to a
C&C scheme:
– The Tor network is a public network with hundreds
of thousands of users. Bots are able to hide among
those legitimate users to prevent identification. This
is a large benefit over creating and using a private
bot-only network.
– Uploads and downloads of orders can be
anonymised. This is true in that the uploader
and downloader IP addresses are kept secret;
taking control over a single bot or server doesn’t
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allow you to track down other servers or bots. It’s
also true in that there is no registration or use of
user accounts.
Additionally our particular use Tor provides an extra
benefit:
– Uploaded orders are hosted by neutral third-party
(non-bot) servers who don’t know what they’re serv-
ing. This is great because it doesn’t require bots re-
veal their identity and publicly serve orders to other
bots.
Compared to other C&C schemes that make use of Tor
hidden services, for instance an IRC server accessible
as a hidden service, ours is far more efficient, less dam-
aging to the network and more scalable. On the down
side it’s less responsive than an IRC based system. Or-
ders are pulled by bots periodically rather than pushed
from the herder out to the bots. The responsiveness
can be anything; it’s a trade-off between frequency of
bots pulling orders and the overall negative effect that
the botnet has on the Tor network. Our scheme is also
potentially more secure versus deanonymisation, as it
only utilizes the first half of the Tor hidden services
protocol. Since it’s far simpler than a scheme that uses
the entirety of the hidden services protocol there is less
avenue for attack.
Our scheme works by making use of the name-
resolution system that’s built into the Tor hidden ser-
vices protocol. The name-resolution system is used to
resolve a hidden service’s .onion address into informa-
tion that is required to connect to that hidden service.
The name resolution system consists of a DHT (Dis-
tributed Hash Table) which hidden service descriptors
are uploaded to. A hidden service descriptor is a docu-
ment that contains, primarily, a list of the hidden ser-
vice’s introduction points. A hidden service’s introduc-
tion points are onion-routers which can be contacted by
a client to establish a connection to that hidden service.
In Tor hidden services V2 [12] the list of introduc-
tion points can be optionally encrypted. In Tor hid-
den services V3 [4] (currently unimplemented and in
its draft phase) the list of introduction points is always
encrypted. Because this list is encrypted the servers in
the DHT that host the descriptors are unable to see its
real contents. This means that the servers are unable
to validate the contents of the encrypted section, and
hence we can include arbitrary data instead of a list of
introduction points.
In this paper we propose a method of botnet C&C
that uses the encrypted section of hidden service de-
scriptors to store and propagate orders for bots. Be-
cause V3 hidden services are currently unimplemented
we will only describe the scheme in terms of V2 hidden
services. In Section 2 we discuss the format of hidden
service descriptors, in Section 3 we discuss how we make
use of descriptors in our scheme, and in Section 4 we
discuss how descriptors are published and downloaded.
In Section 5 we then discuss how to avoid damaging the
Tor network, and then in Section 6 we discuss potential
countermeasures that the Tor project could use against
a botnet implementing our scheme.
2 Descriptor format
The benefit of using Tor to a botnet is primarily
anonymity; the same benefit provided to regular hid-
den service operators and clients. Hidden services are
designed to anonymise both ends of a connection, the
client and the server. Hidden service descriptors must
be uploaded anonymously, but must also be download-
able and usable by any client who knows the hidden ser-
vice’s .onion address. Hence, if we use hidden service
descriptors to contain C&C information botnet herders
will be able to publish commands anonymously and
clients will be able to download them anonymously.
A .onion address is used to identify a hidden service
in the network. It is calculated based on the hidden ser-
vice’s long-term-public-identity-key and never changes:
onion address = base32(permanent id) || “.onion”,
where
permanent id = substr(0, 20,hex(SHA1(
substr(22,DER(
public identity key))))),
the hidden service’s long-term-public-identity key en-
coded in DER, with the first 22 bytes cut off, hashed
using SHA1 and truncated to the first 80 bits.
From the hidden service’s .onion address (remem-
ber that this contains permanent id) and the current
time we can then calculate descriptor-ids. Descriptor-
ids are used to uniquely identify each hidden service
descriptor in such a way that the associated .onion
address is kept secret.
descriptor id = SHA1(bytes(permanent id) ||
bytes(secret id part)),
where
secret id part = SHA1(bytes(time period) ||
byte(replica)),
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and
replica = An integer.
Either 0 or 1 in regular Tor.
We use this as our page number.
time period = (current time +
permanent id byte ∗
86400/256)/86400,
current time = The number of seconds
since 1970-01-01 00:00,
permanent id byte = permanent id[0]
= The first byte of permanent id.





-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
<public_identity_key>












Where the value <descriptor signature> is the
bytes of the SHA1 hash of everything before (and in-
cluding) the text signature, encrypted using the hid-
den service’s private identity key (RSA private-key en-
cryption using PKCS.1 padding).
Where <encrypted data> is where we put our C&C
data. Usually this contains a list of introduction points
which may or may not be encrypted. Hidden Service Di-
rectories (HSDirs), the onion-routers that host hidden
service descriptors, treat this as if it’s always encrypted
and hence are unable to validate the section because
they have no way to decrypt its contents; this allows us
to include arbitrary data instead, as little to no valida-
tion is performed on it. Section 3 describes how we use
this section in our scheme.
The contents of the <encrypted data> section are
quite flexible. For instance the contents do not need
to be encoded in base64: it is willing to accept strings
with non-base64 characters such as spaces, however,
some characters such as quotes will be rejected. The
contents don’t actually need to be encrypted either.
Lines do not need to be wrapped to 64 characters.
There is no minimum length. It will accept 0 char-
acters between the “-----BEGIN MESSAGE-----” and
“-----END MESSAGE-----” tags. And the maximum
length appears to be 10,000 characters.
The value of <publication time> is the time
that the descriptor was published in the format
<YYYY>-<MM>-<DD> <HH>:00:00 (we round the time
down to the hour [12] so we set the minutes and seconds
to 00).1
And where the remaining values between angle
brackets are place holders for values that we used earlier
in the section:
<descriptor id> = base32(descriptor id),
<public identity key> = PEM(public identity key),
<secret id part> = base32(secret id part).
3 Architecture
In regular Tor each active .onion address has, at any
time, two hidden service descriptors, each hosted at
three servers, called Hidden Service Directories (HS-
Dirs). Six servers is fine for small botnets, but when we
have several million bots all downloading the current
set of commands it is likely to be far too little.
To improve scalability of the botnet’s C&C architec-
ture we use a simple two-level hierarchical topology for
the servers. The bots all come with a hard-coded a set of
public-keys that we’ll refer to as root public-keys. From
each of these keys a .onion address can be derived (as
described in Section 2). We’ll refer to these .onion ad-
dresses as root .onion addresses. The descriptors that
can be download using a root .onion address all con-
tain a list of other .onion addresses; those addresses
are each called intermediate .onion addresses.
The descriptors that can be downloaded using an
intermediate .onion address each contain a copy of the
current orders from the botnet herder. All intermedi-








====⇒ j’th copy of the
current botnet orders.
1 While the specification [12] states we should round down
to the nearest hour it is not always done in practice.
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When a new bot enters the network it must boot-
strap itself. It does so by randomly selecting one of
the root .onion address, then using that it downloads
the list of intermediate .onion addresses. This process
closely mirrors the order fetching process shown in Sec-
tion 4; the main difference being that a root .onion
address is used instead of an intermediate one. The
<public identity key> in this descriptor must match
one of the root public keys that the bot has hard-coded,
otherwise the descriptor is considered a forgery2. From
then onward the bot periodically downloads new sets
of orders, each time using a randomly selected inter-
mediate .onion address. Period lengths could be every
hour, every day, or anything else. It depends on how
responsive you want the botnet to be; a short period
will make the botnet more responsive, however it may
overload the HSDirs with too many requests.
Bots should select their initial download time at
random. Say this isn’t done and instead the download-
period was 24 hours with each bot making their first
download at 2:15am; the intermediate servers would be
hit with thousands of requests at 2:15am each day but
none at other times. This sudden spike in traffic would
appear quite suspicious, and, if enough bots were in the
botnet (and there were too few intermediate servers)
it might actually cause the intermediate servers to be
DDoS’d. If each bot selects a random time for their first
download, requests would be more evenly distributed
over each download period and the traffic would seem
more normal.
Currently the maximum amount of data we can
squeeze into a single descriptor is 10,000 characters.
We can get around this character limit by making use
of replica numbers. In regular Tor every descriptor has
two replicas: replica 0 and replica 1. They are both ex-
actly the same except for the values that their replica
number modifies: secret id part and descriptor id,
as well as the descriptor signature. Replica numbers are
not included in hidden service descriptors so there is no
way for a HSDir to determine if a replica number other
than 0 or 1 is actually used. This allows us to re-purpose
the replica number, and instead use it as a page number.
For example, the first page of our botnet orders is page
0, and hence its replica number is 0. If the orders can’t
be squeezed into a single hidden service descriptor we
put a “is last page?” marker inside page 0 that specifies
that this is not the last page of orders. We then publish
another page of orders: page 1, whose replica number is
2 Note that when they’re implemented, V3 hidden services
won’t require this step as an .onion address will consist of a
hidden service’s whole public identity key encoded in base32.
This means there will be no danger of hash collisions as there
is with the current hidden service address scheme.
1. If a third page of orders is required we do the same
thing over again; we put a “is last page?” marker inside
page 1 that specifies it’s not the last page, then publish
a third page of orders, page 2 whose replica number is
2. This goes on and on until the entirety of the orders
are published. The last page would then contain an “is
last page?” marker specifying that it is indeed the last
page.
Figure 1 demonstrates how this page system works.
Intermediate onion-addressj














Fig. 1 The jth copy of a three page set of orders. Each de-
scriptor is hosted by 3 different servers (HSDirs). Our orders
are the concatenation of all three pages. All three descriptors
are created using the same .onion address, and Descriptor i is
the descriptor whose secret id part and descriptor id were
calculated using the replica number i. The inner box rep-
resents the <encrypted data> section of the descriptor. The
Signatures are each the hash all pages and all descriptor-ids,
signed using one of the private root key; this proves that the
orders are legitimate and prevents hostile takeover of the bot-
net.
As the size of the botnet increases we can add more
intermediate .onion addresses to create more mirrors
for the orders and hence reduce the burden on the ex-
isting intermediate servers. Every intermediate .onion
address increases the number of copies of the orders be-
ing hosted by 3. The number of root .onion addresses
never changes, however, but since bots only contact
them once during their lifetime their scalability isn’t
a huge issue.
Sets of orders and the lists of intermediate .onion
addresses should be re-uploaded by the herder every
hour or whenever their content changes. This is to keep
the orders current and to prevent expiration of orders.
All lists of intermediate .onion addresses and all
sets of orders should be signed using all the root private-
keys whose associated public keys were used to generate
the root .onion addresses. There should be one sig-
nature for each root public-key. A signature is created
by concatenating all the pages and descriptor-ids to-
gether, in order, then encrypting that hash using one of
the root private-keys. This makes hijacking of the bot-
net significantly harder as it requires a herder to know
a whole set of private keys rather than a single one. We
include the descriptor-ids in the hash because doing
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so ties the pages to the descriptors, and hence prevents
replay attacks from an attacker who knows one or more
of the root private-keys. Alternatively you could intro-
duce another key pair, an order-signing key pair that
is used solely for signing orders; only the herder would
know the private key, and they would use it to sign or-
ders instead of signing using all the root private-keys.
The following formula shows how a set of signatures
should be created for a set of descriptors hosted under
the same .onion address. The function hash can be any
hash function, and the function Encrypti encrypts the
hash using the ith root private-key.
Signatures = {Signature0, . . . , Signaturek}
Signaturei = Encrypti(
hash(descriptor-id0 || page0
|| . . .
|| descriptor-idk || pagek))
Figure 1 demonstrates where the list of signatures
should be included: along with the last page of orders.
4 Publishing and fetching orders
When a bot wants to fetch the latest set of orders it
does as follows:
1. The bot selects one of the intermediate .onion ad-
dresses at random. It knows these from when it
bootstrapped itself after its initial infection.
2. It calculates the descriptor-id of the first page
using the selected intermediate .onion address and
the replica number 0.
3. The bot downloads the descriptor with that
descriptor-id.
(a) If the bot isn’t able to download that descriptor
it should wait for a short time, then start again
at Step 1.
(b) If the bot successfully downloads the descriptor
it should continue to Step 4
4. The bot checks that the descriptor is a valid de-
scriptor. This involves parsing the descriptor and
checking that each field is valid (Section 2).
(a) If the descriptor fails validation the bot should
go back to Step 1.
(b) If the descriptor is valid the bot should continue
to Step 5.
5. The bot extracts the page from the descriptor and
checks to see if it’s the last page.
(a) If it’s not the last page, the bot calculates the
descriptor-id of the next page by increment-
ing the replica number, then proceeds to Step 3.
(b) If it is the last page the bot proceeds to Step 6.
6. The bot now has all pages and validates them by
checking that the signatures on the last page are
correct. Section 3 describes what these signatures
are and how they’re created. The signatures are vali-
dated by decrypting each hash using the root public-
keys, then recalculating the hash and comparing it
to the decrypted values.
(a) If the decrypted hashes don’t match the cal-
culated one the pages are invalid and the bot
should start again at Step 1.
(b) If the decrypted hashes do match then the pages
are valid and the orders can be obtained by con-
catenating all pages together in order.
The client fetches the first page of the current or-
ders from a randomly selected intermediate server. The
client then continues to fetch subsequent descriptors
(pages) by increasing the replica number and download-
ing descriptors until finally they reach the last page.
Note that the easiest way to perform Steps 2, 3, and
4 is by using a modified Tor client as Tor already has all
that functionality built into it. In our proof of concept
implementation we modified a version of the Orchid Tor
client to perform those steps for us.
Also note that it is a requirement that the descriptor
download be done based on descriptor-id rather than by
.onion address as our use of replica numbers is differ-
ent than that of regular Tor’s. This is because in Tor
replicas are assumed to all be the same descriptor, just
with a different descriptor-id; in our system replicas are
like pages of a book, they’re likely all different. That
being said, each replica (page) is still uploaded to, and
downloadable from three separate HSDirs.
If you wanted to implement Step 3 yourself,
the downloading of the descriptors, you would need
to first calculate the HSDirs associated with the
descriptor. To do this you would need to get
hold of a network consensus document, such as
the cached-microdesc-consensus document which is
downloaded automatically when you run Tor. You
would then select the three onion-routers in that con-
sensus who had the HSDir flag and whose identity-
digest was closest to (and larger than) the descriptor-id
of the descriptor. Those three onion-routers are the de-
scriptor’s HSDirs. You would then create a circuit end-
ing at one of those HSDirs and make a HTTP GET
request of the form:
GET /tor/rendezvous2/<descriptor-id> HTTP/1.0
Host: <HSDir-IP>:<HSDir-port>
Servers running newer versions of Tor won’t accept di-
rect, unencrypted HTTP GET and POST requests for
hidden service descriptors. Additionally, it’s important
to note that if we don’t make our requests over a Tor
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circuit all anonymity is lost. To achieve this our imple-
mentation downloads and publishes descriptors using a
modified (Tor) Orchid client. Orchid is a Java imple-
mentation of Tor and was used as it was found to be
far easier to modify than the main Tor client (which is
written in C).
When a bot downloads a hidden service descrip-
tor it must validate it in much the same way that
Tor validates descriptors (Step 4). If you wanted to
implement this yourself you must first examine the
<public identity key> section of the descriptor to see
that it’s a valid public key. Next the bot must check that
the <descriptor signature> is valid. To do this it de-
crypts the <descriptor signature> section using the
public key in <public identity key>; it then takes the
SHA1 hash of everything proceeding (and including)
the line “signature”, and checks that it matches the
decrypted value. If the decryption is successful and the
value matches then the descriptor is considered valid.
The following gives an overview of how you could
implement the descriptor-publishing functionality:
1. Split the orders into sets of pages, each 9999 or less
characters with an added character acting as the “is
last page?” marker.
2. Select the first intermediate .onion address.
3. For each page calculate a descriptor-id using the
.onion address and the page number as the replica
number.
4. Use the descriptor-ids and pages to calculate the
list of signatures, as shown in Section 3, then append
this list of signatures to the last page (or create a
new page for them if there isn’t enough room).
5. For each page, create a descriptor containing it and
its descriptor-id, then publish that descriptor to
the 3 HSDirs associated with the descriptor-id.
6. If more intermediate .onion addresses exist select
the next one and go back to Step 3. Otherwise end.
In the Step 5 we calculate the descriptor’s HSDirs
and then publish the descriptor to them. As with the
bot client order fetching operation, this function, that
is, calculation of the HSDirs and the HTTP POST
request are handled by a modified Tor client. If you
wanted to do the POST requests manually you would
create a Tor circuit to each HSDir in turn, sending a





where <descriptor> is the descriptor, and
<content-length> is the length of the descriptor. If a
descriptor publish is successful you should receive the
message HTTP/1.0 200 Service descriptor (v2)
stored in return.
It’s interesting to note that the server you upload
a descriptor to does not actually need to be be the
correctly chosen HSDir. Experiments suggest they can
be uploaded to arbitrary servers, provided they have
the HSDir flag. It helps secrecy, however, if you use
the correct HSDirs as the descriptors will appear more
legitimate then.
5 Avoiding network congestion
Botnets are huge and have the power to bring a net-
work, such as the Tor network to its knees, even by
accident. It is important for the health of the Tor net-
work that the impact of botnets is minimised. If the
network is heavily congested then not only do honest
Tor users suffer, but the botnet also suffers. To remedy
this we suggest that some percentage of bots are se-
lected to become onion-routers, and as such help allevi-
ate the botnet’s strain to the network. Here we focus on
“breaking even”, that is, reducing the botnet’s impact
to zero. We use the following notation in this section:
h = The number of honest Tor clients in the network.
According to the Tor metrics website [10] this value
is currently h ≈ 2450000.
r = The number of honest Tor onion-routers in the
network. According to the Tor metrics website [10]
this value is currently r ≈ 6000.
b = The number of bot Tor clients in the network.
p = The number of bot onion-routers in the network.
Our goal here is to calculate pb , the number of bots that
we should turn into onion-routers in order to offset the
resources used by our botnet.
By far the easiest way to “break even” is to main-
tain the ratio of Tor clients to Tor onion-routers, rh .
Since they only need to do one quick operation we can
assume that our bots will use the same amount or less
bandwidth and circuit creations as regular clients, so
setting pb =
r
h makes it almost certain that the botnet
will have a neutral or positive affect on the Tor net-
work. This gives us a ratio of pb ≈ 60002450000 , or, for every
1225 bots, 3 should become onion-routers.
With this ratio in mind we’re left with the question
of how to select which bots become onion-routers. The
simplest answer to this is simply by having each flip
a biased coin; if heads they become an onion-router, if
tails they don’t. Due to the vast size of botnets this
probabilistic method is sufficient. If 5 million bots each
flip a coin biased with the probability p/b we’re likely
to get a distribution very close to p/b.
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As this is the easiest method it’s also very approxi-
mate. A better estimate would be calculating the num-
ber of onion-routers required to offset the number of cir-
cuit creations. This method, however, is more difficult
as it requires measurements that are not readily avail-
able: the average number of circuit creation operations
an onion-router participates in during a time period.
If we did have such a measurement we could calculate
the ratio as: pb =
c
C , where C = the average number
of circuit creation operations (circuit handshakes) an
onion-router takes part in per-second. This value isn’t
available on Tor metrics so it would require independent
measurement to discover. And where c = the average
number of circuit creation operations a bot participants
in per-second. The value of c isn’t as simple as it may
seem at first; it requires us to know on average how
many times a client fails to download a descriptor be-
fore they’re successful. As these measurements aren’t
available we use the previous ratio instead.
6 Defences against this scheme
There are no obvious ways to prevent this scheme from
being useful without also harming the Tor network and
honest Tor clients. Here we discuss a few potential ways
of defending against it and how effective they would be.
6.1 Clear-text hidden service descriptors
Making all hidden service descriptors plain-text rather
than allowing encryption would effectively kill our
scheme by allowing descriptors to be properly validated.
It would, however, also weaken the Tor hidden service
protocol. Hidden service descriptors can be encrypted
for a reason: in version 3 it’s to prevent HSDirs from
knowing which hidden service they’re serving descrip-
tors for, and in version 2 to provide an optional form of
client authentication. Because of these reasons remov-
ing encryption is a bad idea.
6.2 .onion blacklisting
You could try to attack this scheme by using .onion
address blacklisting. An adversary could observe an in-
fected machine and compile a list of all the .onion ad-
dresses used by the botnet. They could then create a
blacklist of .onion addresses whose descriptors should
be rejected by HSDirs. Assuming they could get all HS-
Dirs to agree to abide by the blacklist this would pre-
vent the scheme from working properly, but with a few
modifications this filtering could easily be bypassed.
The reason the scheme can be bypassed is our non-
standard use of replica numbers. The blocker doesn’t
know how many pages are being published, and if non-
sequential replica numbers are used they wouldn’t know
the replica numbers of the pages either. The descriptors
could not be blacklisted without knowledge of which
replica numbers are used, and hence filtering could not
be performed.
Additional difficulties with this scheme arise from
the fact that it would require great cooperation from
all HSDirs. To achieve such cooperation the blacklisting
feature would probably need to be a default part of the
Tor software. Whether the Tor project would endorse
and implement a hidden service censorship mechanism
is up for debate.
6.3 Waiting time between re-uploads
Currently it’s possible to upload a hidden service de-
scriptor and then immediately upload a second one that
overwrites the first. This lack of a cooldown period al-
lows bot herders to change the current set of orders
quickly, without waiting. We could fix this by imposing
a limit, such as not allowing a new upload for 30 min-
utes after the first. Doing that would make the C&C
scheme less responsive and hence less lucrative for a
potential herder.
The downside is that it also makes hidden services
less robust against changes to the network. Take for
instance a situation where the introduction points of
a hidden service suddenly vanish before the cooldown
period is over. This will make the hidden service inac-
cessible to new clients until the cooldown has finished.
6.4 Strict descriptor format
We could introduce a strict format for lists of intro-
duction points in hidden service descriptors. The most
obvious rule we could include is checking that the list of
introduction-points is encoded in base64 (not currently
checked). Another method could be encrypting each in-
troduction point in the list separately, i.e., three sep-
arately encrypted introduction points rather than one
large blob. You could then limit the number of intro-
duction points to an exact number (i.e., always three).
This would make our scheme more impractical as there
would be less space to work with and the space would
need to conform to a specific format.
The downside of this is that it reduces the flexibility
of hidden service descriptors for regular hidden services
as well. Only allowing a specific number of introduction
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points removes the possibility of hidden services choos-
ing the number of introduction points they have based
on their own specific requirements.
7 Conclusion
This vulnerability is not a significant threat to the Tor
network, but does present a new way in which Tor may
be misused. Defending against the attack without re-
ducing the strength of the Tor protocol is difficult, but
a few measures can be put in place to do so. In all like-
lihood this vulnerability will continue to exist into the
future but will be made less efficient to the point that
it is essentially useless.
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